The Right to be Wrong
| Autoři | |
|---|---|
| Rok publikování | 2020 |
| Druh | Další prezentace na konferencích |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| Popis | What does it mean to be wrong about something? For purposes of this talk, I will define that to be wrong means to carry out actions that do not result in intended outcomes or they have unintended effects more harmful then it is acceptable.I will argue that there is the right to be wrong in any critical discussion and that there are two basic forms of it. The first form is regarding the limited abilities of the parties involved. Even though parties succeed in resolving the difference in their opinion, they still might be wrong. Parties are restricted regarding their knowledge and other cognitive capacities. The second form of right to be wrong is due to the nature of critical discussion itself. Parties are limited to reasonable means. It is not permissible in critical discussion to use brute force on others to make them follow the rules or stay in the discussion. Furthermore, if one party is not further interested in the given discussion and the resolution of a difference of opinions is not achieved, another party cannot claim success in defending its position, and this position is justified regarding critical rationalism. I will argue that this poses a severe problem for any form of paternalism. Although this problem is not unsolvable, if we want to follow critical rationalism, there is a strong demand to be able to accept outcomes that seems to be and even might be harmful and damaging. We have to be able to take results which are adopted in due process or challenge the process itself in meta-discussions.There are two crucial questions that I want to address: Do also institutions have the right to be wrong, and in what forms? Is this right applicable when the stakes are high? |