Paradigmatic Samples, Self-Reference and the White Knight's Paradox

Varování

Publikace nespadá pod Ekonomicko-správní fakultu, ale pod Filozofickou fakultu. Oficiální stránka publikace je na webu muni.cz.
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MÁCHA Jakub

Rok publikování 2016
Druh Článek ve sborníku
Konference Aesthetics Today. Papers of the 39th International Wittgenstein Symposium
Fakulta / Pracoviště MU

Filozofická fakulta

Citace
www https://www.academia.edu/24449851/Paradigmatic_Samples_Self-Reference_and_the_White_Knights_Paradox
Obor Filosofie a náboženství
Klíčová slova Ludwig Wittgenstein;Giorgio Agamben;Cora Diamond;Alain Badiou;Bertrand Russell;Paradoxes;Gottlob Frege;Lewis Carroll;Alice in Wonderland
Popis The name of the name is not the name. This is the White Knight’s paradox coined by Giorgio Agamben taking up a line from Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass. I am going to show that there are rigorous formulations of this paradox in Frege and the early Wittgenstein. However, we can find almost an exact restatement of the White Knight’s paradox in terms of paradigmatic samples in the later Wittgenstein: “one proposition can never describe the paradigm in another, unless it ceases to be a paradigm.” (PG, p.346) I shall argue that such self-referential propositions, which lie on the limit of language, can mark something radically new, something that marks a radical change of our language and the world, something that was inexpressible previously.
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