Apriorism, Psychologism and Conceptualism about Thought Experiments

Varování

Publikace nespadá pod Ekonomicko-správní fakultu, ale pod Filozofickou fakultu. Oficiální stránka publikace je na webu muni.cz.
Název česky Apriorismus, psychologismus a konceptualismus v rámci myšlenkových experimentů
Autoři

PICHA Marek

Rok publikování 2014
Druh Článek v odborném periodiku
Časopis / Zdroj Dókos. Revista Filosófica
Fakulta / Pracoviště MU

Filozofická fakulta

Citace
Obor Filosofie a náboženství
Klíčová slova thought experiments; epistemology
Popis Epistemological optimists about thought experiments hold that imagination could be under certain conditions source of epistemic justification. Their claim is usually based on one of three dominant conceptions about epistemic value of thought experiments. Apriorism states that imagination may serve as unique a priori source of new synthetic knowledge about the actual world. I argue against this view and show that apriorism is either too weak, or too strong or too vague. Psychologism is viable, yet not fully clear conception about new meta-knowledge obtained by thought experimenting. I compare some interpretations of this position and present reasons for favorizing one of them. Conceptualism considers thought experiments as instruments for cleaning our conceptual systems. I argue that this position is in fact not about epistemic value of thought experiments, but about one specific usage of experimental result.
Související projekty:

Používáte starou verzi internetového prohlížeče. Doporučujeme aktualizovat Váš prohlížeč na nejnovější verzi.