It Ought To Be therefore It Is: On Fallaciousness of so-called Moralistic Fallacy
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2018 |
| Type | Article in Proceedings |
| Conference | Argumentation and Inference: Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation: Volume II, Fribourg 2017 |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Keywords | argument scheme; moralistic fallacy; ought-is inference; pragma-dialectics |
| Description | The problem of moralistic fallacy, crossing the gap from ought-propositions to is-propositions, is considered with regard to four questions: Should we consider all ought-propositions (or is-propositions) in the same manner? Is the ought-is move an inference or is it just a case of a practical assumption? Is this move fallacious in any discussion? To address these questions, we use the pragma-dialectical theory, where the ought-is relation is argumentatively considered as a relation between propositions in reason and standpoint. |