It Ought To Be therefore It Is: On Fallaciousness of so-called Moralistic Fallacy
| Autoři | |
|---|---|
| Rok publikování | 2018 |
| Druh | Článek ve sborníku |
| Konference | Argumentation and Inference: Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation: Volume II, Fribourg 2017 |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| Klíčová slova | argument scheme; moralistic fallacy; ought-is inference; pragma-dialectics |
| Popis | The problem of moralistic fallacy, crossing the gap from ought-propositions to is-propositions, is considered with regard to four questions: Should we consider all ought-propositions (or is-propositions) in the same manner? Is the ought-is move an inference or is it just a case of a practical assumption? Is this move fallacious in any discussion? To address these questions, we use the pragma-dialectical theory, where the ought-is relation is argumentatively considered as a relation between propositions in reason and standpoint. |