A simulation model of a monopoly passenger rail service with two–way traffic: testing the optimization algorithm
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2014 |
| Type | Article in Proceedings |
| Conference | New Economic Challenges: 5th International PhD Student Conference |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Field | Economy |
| Keywords | agent-based model; rail; monopoly; fare; timetable |
| Attached files | |
| Description | We present an agent–based model of a long–distance passenger rail service. The model contains two terminal stations and a monopoly train operating company whose aim is to set the fare and departure times from both stations so that its profit is maximized. The paper introduces an algorithm that combines three different elimination strategies which are used for finding the optimum timetable. Starting from the maximum possible number of departures, the strategies might sequentially eliminate either one random pair of departures, each from a different terminal station, two pairs of departures, or a number of departures necessary to significantly reduce capital costs of the operating company. The strategies might be combined in different proportions. In order to find out whether all strategies should be used and what is the optimal proportion in which the strategies should be applied, we analyze data from 10,800 runs of the model. We find that all strategies are useful. Furthermore, we find that while a frequent use of one–pair elimination leads to a higher profit on average, majority of the most profitable outcomes are created if the strategies are used in more balanced proportions. |
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