Decentralized punishment under different matching types

Authors

BERNÁ Zuzana

Year of publication 2013
Type Article in Proceedings
Conference Proceedings of the 17th International Conference: Current Trends in Public Sector Research
MU Faculty or unit

Faculty of Economics and Administration

Citation
Field Economy
Keywords Cooperation; Voluntary Contribution Mechanism; Decentralized Punishment; Partner Matching; Stranger Matching
Description This paper presents selected results of experiment with Czech University students replicating study of Denant-Boemont et al. (2007, pp. 145–167). The original experiment studied impacts of opportunity of counter-punishment and sanction enforcement in repeated voluntary contribution to public goods. As this experiment was executed in so called partner matching (where subjects interacted with the same co-players during whole session), the aim of author’s replication was to enrich and complete the data by results obtained in stranger matching (where composition of groups changed randomly before each round of a session). The results showed, in accordance with author’s expectations, that strangers contributed considerably less and punished less heavily than partners. This finding is in line with so called strategies hypothesis.
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