Decentralized Punishments in Fighting Corruption: Experimental Evidence from Czech Republic
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2012 |
| Type | Article in Proceedings |
| Conference | MODERN AND CURRENT TRENDS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR RESEARCH |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Field | Economy |
| Keywords | Experiment; corruption; punishment |
| Description | The paper presents possibilities and limits of introducing experimental methods in measuring propensity to engage in and punish corrupt behavior. We are inspired by results of the multicultural experiments run to date. Our experiment is inspired by Cameron et al (2009), which took place in Australia, Indonesia, India and Singapore. It takes a form of a simple sequential game in which three players are involved. The decision of each player has an impact on the behavior and profit of the other players. Results of the experiment are in line with results of replicated experiment. We found several differences between the behavior of the Czech and Slovak participants. Particularly, the Czechs seem to be less tolerant to corruption behavior they witness. Second part of the paper shows the possibilities and limits of using altruistic punishment as anti-corrupt tool. Our finding may support the perceived higher tolerance to corruption behavior in Czech republic and Slovakia. People sometimes do punish free riders (and those who engage corrupt behavior), but the fail to educate others to prevent this behavior. |