Using Game Theory in Public Domains: The Potential and Limitations of Security Games
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2020 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Web | Web s článkem. |
| Doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/nispa-2020-0024 |
| Keywords | game theory; sequential games; Stackelberg game; security systems; national security |
| Attached files | |
| Description | Since its origins, when it was mainly connected to the field of economics, game theory has brought important theoretic insights into many domains. Besides biology, philosophy or computer science, its findings have been applied to various fields of public policy. One specific area of public policy is that of security. Within the two last decades we have been witnesses to a significant increase in efforts to model security issues using tools of game theory and to derive political implications. The paper deals with the model of a Stackelberg security game and its real-world applications in security domains. The main aim and purpose of the paper is to provide with a survey of selected cases of real-world deployed applications of the game-theoretic Stackelberg model in the area of public security and, based on the literature analysis, to discuss the potential and limitations of the model for policy- and decision-makers that are dealing with security measures on various governmental levels. Existing cases clearly indicate that the model can contribute to better designing and implementation of the security policy and help better allocation of resources and thus potentially improve effectiveness of security measures. On the other hand, the paper also discusses some limitations and potential future adjustments of the model together with points for a further research. |