Ex-ante targeting in lobbying strategies: an experimental study



Year of publication 2017
Type Article in Proceedings
Conference Proceedings of the 21st International Conference Current Trends in Public Sector Research 2017.
MU Faculty or unit

Faculty of Economics and Administration

Web http://ctpsr.econ.muni.cz/cs
Field Economy
Keywords lobbying; strategy; laboratory experiment
Description As lobbying is currently an activity necessary for many interest groups including non-profit organizations, it is important to analyze a variety of potential strategies lobbyists may apply. We conducted a replication of a previous experiment to see whether theories about the ex-ante targeting of different policymakers hold. In the experiment, either two or three players of two types bid on simulated policymakers in order to succeed. In this article, we analyze two basic strategies – the theories of coalition expansion and counteractive lobbying – in terms of how often lobbyists target ex-ante supporters, the opposition, and undecided policymakers. We also focused on the size of lobbyist expenditures. Our investigation suggests that neither of the investigated strategies prevailed and other strategies may be naturally used by lobbyists.
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