Can Ambiguity Aversion Explain Contributions to Public Goods?


ŘEZÁČ Jan KUNA Vojtěch

Year of publication 2014
Type Appeared in Conference without Proceedings
MU Faculty or unit

Faculty of Economics and Administration

Description Authors measured levels of risk aversion and ambiguity aversion (over both gains and losses). Subjects then participated in a one shot public goods game followed by conditional public goods game. It was hypothesized people highly ambiguity averse would make lower unconditional contributions, as the situation could be considered ambiguous, and higher conditional contributions, where no ambiguity exists. Results show there is no relationship between preference measures and contributions in public goods game, suggesting participants do not perceive the situation of public goods game as ambiguous. The only significant variable predicting their unconditional and conditional contribution was their stated belief about contributions of others.
Related projects:

You are running an old browser version. We recommend updating your browser to its latest version.